FISHER’S FISHING EXPEDITION
Vinay Harpalani ∗
On October 10, 2012, I attended the U.S. Supreme Court oral ar1
guments in Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin, the much anticipated
case about race-conscious undergraduate admissions at the University
of Texas at Austin (UT). Abigail Fisher claims that she was treated
unfairly in UT’s admissions process, because UT employs a raceconscious holistic admissions policy to admit a small percentage of its
undergraduate entering class, in addition to the 80 percent that is au2
tomatically admitted via the Top Ten Percent Law. Fisher’s contention is not that she would have been admitted but for the raceconscious policy, but rather that the Top Ten Percent Law itself generates a “critical mass” of minority students—thus precluding UT
3
from using a race-conscious policy under Grutter v. Bollinger.
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Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 631 F.3d 213 (5th Cir. 2011), rehearing en banc denied, 644
F.3d 301 (5th Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 1536 (2012) (No. 11-345). Oral arguments in Fisher occurred on October 10, 2012. Transcript of Oral Argument at 1, Fisher
v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, No. 11-345 (U.S. Oct. 10, 2012), available at
http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/11-345.pdf; Oral
Argument, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, No. 11-345 (U.S. Oct. 10, 2012), available at
http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2012/2012_11_345.
Tex. Educ. Code Ann. § 51.803 (2009). In 2011, the Top Ten Percent Law was amended
“to cap the number of students guaranteed admission at UT Austin to 75% of the seats
available to Texas residents.” Fisher, 631 F.3d at 224 n.56. In prior years, the Top Ten
Percent Law had accounted for the admission of over 80 percent of UT undergraduates.
539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003) (holding that a school may use race in admissions decisions if
the use is narrowly tailored to further a compelling interest in creating a “critical mass” of
minority students to obtain the benefits of a diverse student body).
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Building on my observations and my recent article in the University
4
of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law, this Essay examines the
Fisher oral argument, focusing on two important issues: the meaning
of “critical mass” and the quest for race neutrality in admissions. Ultimately, this Essay argues that Fisher is a fishing expedition, because
neither of these issues is resolvable, or even needs to be resolved to
decide the case.
The question of what constitutes a “critical mass” of minority students came up several times during the Fisher oral arguments. Justice
Sonia Sotomayor first asked Bert Rein, Plaintiffs’ counsel, “[C]ould
5
you tell me what a critical mass was?” Mr. Rein responded that the
question to consider when determining if a critical mass exists is
whether underrepresented minority students are “isolated. . . . [and]
6
unable to speak out[.]” Further, Mr. Rein argued that as a predicate,
Grutter requires “a range, a view as to what would be an appropriate
level of comfort, critical mass . . . [which] . . . allows you to evaluate”
7
whether race-conscious policies are still necessary. To support the
Plaintiffs’ argument that UT had attained a critical mass with the Top
Ten Percent Law alone, Mr. Rein emphasized the “21 percent admis8
sion percentage of . . . underrepresented minorities” at UT in 2004
(the last year before the race-conscious policy was implemented)—
implying that this was sufficient for a critical mass. Thus, the Plaintiffs argued that critical mass can be defined by the combined per-

4

5

6

7
8

Vinay Harpalani, Diversity Within Racial Groups and the Constitutionality of Race-Conscious
Admissions, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 463 (2012). This article was cited in the Society of
American Law Teachers (S.A.L.T.) amicus brief to the U.S. Supreme Court in Fisher. See
Brief for Society of American Law Teachers as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at
14, 22–23, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, No. 11-345 (U.S. argued Oct. 10, 2012), 2012
WL 3418833.
See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 14, audio available at
http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2012/2012_11_345/argument?clip=693/697.
Justice Samuel Alito also asked Mr. Rein, Plaintiffs’ counsel, “[D]o you understand what
the University of Texas thinks is the definition of a critical mass? Because I don’t.” Id. at
20, audio available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2012/2012_11_345/
argument?clip=1114/1120.
See
id.
at
15,
audio
available
at
http://www.oyez.org/cases/20102019/2012/2012_11_345/argument?clip=808/826; see also Grutter, 539 U.S. at 319 (noting that at the trial phase, Dean Jeffrey Lehman of the University of Michigan Law School
testified that “critical mass means numbers such that underrepresented minority students
do not feel isolated or like spokespersons for their race”).
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 19, audio available at
http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2012/2012_11_345/argument?clip=1059/1070.
Id. at 15–16, audio available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2012/
2012_11_345/argument?clip=825/844.
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centage of Black and Latina/o students in an entering class. They
also contended that specific numerical criteria for critical mass, such
as a range or target enrollment where minority students are no long10
11
er isolated, should be defined ex ante by the University. Mr. Rein
stated that lack of such criteria for critical mass was “a flaw
12
in . . . Grutter,” and he asked the Court to require criteria for critical
13
mass. These criteria would presumably be subject to judicial review
to determine whether race-conscious policies were necessary to attain
14
that target. However, when Justice Sotomayor pressed Mr. Rein on
the “standard of critical mass” and asked him what “fixed number”
would be sufficient, Mr. Rein replied only that it was “not [the Plain15
tiffs’] burden to establish the number.”
Chief Justice Roberts essentially asked the same question of UT’s
counsel, Gregory Garre: “when will we know that you’ve reached a
16
critical mass?” Mr. Garre responded that “we look to feedback directly from students about racial isolation that they experience. Do
17
they feel like spokespersons for their race.” On the surface, Mr.
Garre’s response was similar to that of Mr. Rein: both implied that a
critical mass would be present when minority students no longer felt
isolated. However, the parties disagreed sharply on how to determine
whether minority students feel isolated. In contrast to the predetermined numerical range/target advocated by Mr. Rein and the
Plaintiffs, Mr. Garre argued for a holistic set of criteria with no specific ex ante goal: “feedback [via surveys] directly from students about
18
racial isolation that they experience,” “enrollment data, . . . .
[d]iversity in the classroom[,] . . . [and] the racial climate on cam-
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See id.; see also Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 631 F.3d 213, 223 (5th Cir. 2011). This
approach ignores other minority groups such as Native Americans. See Harpalani, supra
note 4, at 514–15.
See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 13.
See id. at 19. Justice Sotomayor compared this to a quota, and in response, Mr. Rein tried
to distinguish between a “quota” and an “operative . . . range.” Id., audio available at
http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2012/2012_11_345/argument?clip=1069/1075.
Id.
at
13,
audio
available
at
http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2012/
2012_11_345/argument?clip=664/671.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 16–17, audio available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2012/
2012_11_345/argument?clip=892/920. Justice Sotomayor used the term “fixed number”
to illustrate how the Plaintiffs’ view of “critical mass” is similar to a quota. See infra note
24 and accompanying text.
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 45–46, audio available at
http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2012/2012_11_345/argument?clip=2649/2660.
Id.
at
46,
audio
available
at
http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2012/
2012_11_345/argument?clip=2698/2699.
Id.
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19

pus.” Based on these criteria, Mr. Garre argued that both universities and courts could review ex post whether a critical mass of minori20
ty students had been attained.
Both of these positions show the flaws in defining “critical mass”
primarily by whether minority students encounter feelings of isola21
tion and tokenism, and in using critical mass as a test for whether
22
race-conscious admissions are permissible. It is difficult to understand the Plaintiffs’ view of critical mass as “a range” in terms other
than a numerical goal/target (even if it is a flexible one). Grutter pro23
scribed such numerical goals, and Justice Sotomayor recognized this
when she said to Mr. Rein: “[b]oy, it sounds awfully like a quota to
me that Grutter said you should not be doing, that you shouldn’t be
24
setting goals, that you shouldn’t be setting quotas.” Although the
25
other Justices did not seem to be bothered by this, the Plaintiffs’ po26
sition on critical mass is inconsistent with Grutter and Bakke. Moreover, how would a university know ex ante whether any number or
percentage of minority students would mitigate feelings of isolation
on campus? Feelings of isolation and tokenism are not just contingent on minority student numbers; student support resources, minority faculty and staff mentors, and many other factors contribute to
whether minority students “feel isolated or like spokespersons for
27
their race.”
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Id. at 48.
Id.
See Harpalani, supra note 4, at 474–76.
See id. at 484–85.
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 329–30 (2003) (noting that “[t]he Law School’s interest is not simply ‘to assure within its student body some specified percentage of a particular group merely because of its race or ethnic origin.’ That would amount to outright racial balancing, which is patently unconstitutional” (quoting Regents of Univ. of Cal. v.
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 307 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.))).
See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 19, audio available at
http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2012/2012_11_345/argument?clip=1089/1103.
For example, Justice Anthony Kennedy later made a comment which assumed that UT
could have “a numerical category a numerical standard [sic], a numerical designation for
critical mass: It’s X percent.” Id. at 52.
See supra note 23.
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 319. See also, e.g., William C. Kidder, Misshaping the River: Proposition
209 and Lessons for the Fisher Case, 39 J.C. & U.L. (forthcoming) at 6, available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2123653 (“The benefits associated with ‘critical mass’ are highly context-dependent and not amenable to a one-size-fits-all admissions target, but these
benefits are no less real and measurable because they are manifest in the complex ecosystem of higher learning.”); Deirdre M. Bowen, Brilliant Disguise: An Empirical Analysis of a
Social Experiment Banning Affirmative Action, 85 IND. L.J. 1197, 1233 (2010) (acknowledging
“the power of creating critical mass and a diverse classroom” but noting that “stigma and
racism . . . were still present”); Tara J. Yosso et al., Critical Race Theory, Racial Microaggressions, and Campus Racial Climate for Latina/o Undergraduates, 79 HARV. EDUC. REV. 659, 660
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UT’s view of critical mass is also problematic: it does not offer any
concrete standard for when minority students no longer feel isolated,
28
which could serve as a stopping point for race-conscious admissions.
29
Chief Justice Roberts pressed this point repeatedly, and Justice So30
tomayor also raised it. Mr. Garre only offered that critical mass is
attained when “underrepresented minorities . . . do not feel like
spokespersons for their race, . . . [where] an environment where
cross-racial understanding is promoted, . . .[and] educational bene31
fits of diversity are realized” —an explanation which did not appear
32
to satisfy Chief Justice Roberts. Even if these criteria could be relia33
bly assessed, Mr. Garre did not suggest how universities or courts
could determine whether race-conscious policies were still necessary
to attain them. It is likely that some percentage of minority students
would “feel isolated and like spokespersons” for the foreseeable fu34
ture, even if minority enrollment increased significantly. Moreover,
if, say in 2013, UT had reached a point where enough minority students no longer felt isolated, it would still have done so in part by using race-conscious admissions policies. Eliminating consideration of
race might lead to a drop in minority student enrollment, such that
35
minority students once again “feel isolated or like spokespersons.”
Thus, neither Mr. Rein nor Mr. Garre provided an answer to Chief
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(2009) (examining the ways in which Latinas/os respond to racial microaggressions and
confront hostile campus racial climates).
For an elaboration of this critique, see Harpalani, supra note 4, at 510.
See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 46–47, audio available at
http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2012/2012_11_345/argument?clip=2698/2699.
Id. at 48–49, audio available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2012/
2012_11_345/argument?clip=2790/2806.
Id. at 49, audio available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2012/2012_11_345/
argument?clip=2826/2853.
Id. at 46–47 (“[Y]ou conduct a survey and ask students if they feel racially isolated. . . . And that’s the basis for our Constitutional determination?”), audio available at
http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2012/2012_11_345/argument?clip=2699/2708.
See William C. Kidder, The Salience of Racial Isolation: African Americans’ and Latinos’ Perceptions of Climate and Enrollment Choices With and Without Proposition 209, CIVIL RIGHTS
PROJECT AT UCLA, 13 (Oct. 9, 2012), http://civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/collegeaccess/affirmative-action/the-salience-of-racial-isolation-african-americans2019-andlatinos2019-perceptions-of-climate-and-enrollment-choices-with-and-without-proposition209/Kidder_Racial-Isolation_CRP_final_Oct2012.pdf (“Notwithstanding the complexities
of campus climate and critical mass, . . . data from leading research universities show that
higher levels of racial diversity are generally better for the campus climate faced by African American students, whereas racial isolation in combination with an affirmative action
ban is associated with a more inhospitable racial climate.”); id. at 6 (“The data lend support to the concept of ‘critical mass’ while acknowledging that context matters and it is
unrealistic to expect an across-the-board numerical definition of what constitutes sufficient critical mass.”).
See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 319 (2003).
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Justice Roberts’s and Justice Sotomayor’s questions about a stopping
point for race-conscious admissions. “Critical mass” cannot adequate36
ly provide such an answer.
The idea that critical mass entails “numbers such that underrepresented minority students do not feel isolated or like spokespersons
37
for their race” derives from the University of Michigan’s argument
38
during the trial phase of Grutter. However, while the Grutter majority
cited this language, it further defined “critical mass” in functional
terms, noting that “when a critical mass of underrepresented minority students is present, racial stereotypes lose their force because
nonminority students learn there is no ‘minority viewpoint’ but ra39
ther a variety of viewpoints among minority students.” According to
this view, critical mass involves having a “variety of viewpoints among
40
minority students,” as such diversity within racial groups helps to
break down racial stereotypes—and thus to actualize the educational
41
benefits of diversity.
Unfortunately, UT did not raise the “diversity within racial
42
groups” argument until its Supreme Court brief, and UT did not tie
this argument directly to the concept of critical mass or to the com-
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See Harpalani, supra note 4, at 484–85.
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 319. See also Harpalani, supra note 4, at 474–75 n.34. The Plaintiffs in
Fisher also defined “critical mass” in similar terms. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin,
631 F.3d 213, 243 (5th Cir. 2011) (noting that the Plaintiffs-Appellants contend that “the
concept of critical mass is defined by the minimum threshold for minority students to
have their ideas represented in class discussions and not to feel isolated or like spokespersons for their race”); Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 6, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin,
631 F.3d 213 (2009) (No. 09-50822) (arguing that “critical mass” is defined as “a sufficient
number of underrepresented minority students such that such minority students would
‘not feel isolated or like spokespersons for their race’” (quoting Grutter, 539 U.S. at 318–
19)). See also I. Bennett Capers, Flags, 48 HOW. L.J. 121, 122–23 (2004) (“[C]ritical mass
implies a climate where one is neither conspicuous nor on display, where one does not
feel the opprobrium of being a token, nor the burden of being the designated representative for an entire group. It also implies a climate where one can speak freely, where
one not only has a voice, but a voice that will be heard.”).
See supra note 6.
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 319–20. See also id. at 333 (“The Law School does not premise its need
for critical mass on ‘any belief that minority students always (or even consistently) express
some characteristic minority viewpoint on any issue.’ To the contrary, diminishing the
force of such stereotypes is both a crucial part of the Law School’s mission, and one that
it cannot accomplish with only token numbers of minority students.” (citation omitted)
(quoting Brief for Respondent Bollinger et al. at 30, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306
(2003) (No. 02-241))).
Id. at 320.
See also Harpalani, supra note 4, at 477–78.
See Brief of Respondents at 33, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 631 F.3d 213 (2012) (No.
11-345), 2012 WL 3245488 (asserting that “[h]olistic review permits the consideration of
diversity within racial groups”). However, UT does not elaborate upon this idea or analyze it in any depth. See also Harpalani, supra note 4, at 505 n.183 and accompanying text.
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43

pelling interest in Grutter. UT had already built its argument about
44
critical mass around classroom isolation of minority students : as a
consequence, the reference to diversity within racial groups was cur45
sory and seemed like a last-minute addition. When Mr. Garre raised
this reference in the Fisher oral argument, several of the Justices retorted sharply. Mr. Garre argued that UT “would want representatives and different viewpoints from individuals within the
46
same . . . racial group,” such as “the minority candidate who has
shown that . . . he or she has succeeded in an integrated environ47
ment.” Justice Samuel Alito replied that UT’s argument was essentially that “[t]he top 10 percent plan . . . [is] faulty, because it doesn’t
admit enough African Americans and Hispanics who come from priv48
ileged backgrounds.” And after Mr. Garre reiterated his point about
49
the educational benefits of within-group diversity, Justice Anthony
50
Kennedy—whose vote will likely be decisive in Fisher —seemed dismayed that “what counts is race above all. . . . You want underprivileged of a certain race and privileged of a certain race. So that’s
51
race.” Mr. Garre again noted that “it’s members of the same racial
52
group . . . bringing different experiences,” but Justice Kennedy
53
seemed unmoved.
43
44
45
46
47

48
49

50
51
52
53

Id.
See id. at 504–05.
See id. at 505 n.183 and accompanying text.
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 41, audio available at
http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2012/2012_11_345/argument?clip=2394/2411.
Id.
at
42,
audio
available
at
http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2012/
2012_11_345/argument?clip=2426/2452. See also Harpalani, supra note 4, at 512–13 (noting that the Top Ten Percent Law serves largely to admit Black and Latina/o students
from highly segregated public schools).
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 43, audio available at
http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2012/2012_11_345/argument?clip=2502/2548.
Id. at 44 (noting that UT “want[s] minorities from different backgrounds”). See also id. at
45, audio available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2012/2012_11_345/
argument?clip=2563/2634 (noting that for “any racial group, . . . [UT] would want people from different perspectives”).
See Harpalani, supra note 4, at 464 n.3.
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 44, audio available at
http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2012/2012_11_345/argument?clip=2563/2634.
Id. at 45, audio available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2012/2012_11_345/
argument?clip=2563/2634.
I base this assertion on the comments noted in the text, on my observations during the
oral argument, and on the audio clip of the oral argument, available at
http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2012/2012_11_345/argument?clip=2563/2634.
Also, in examining Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Parents Involved in Community Schools
v. Seattle School District No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 782 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment) (concurring with majority in striking race-conscious
school assignment plans, but noting that certain race-conscious strategies are permissible), Professor Reva Siegel argues that Justice Kennedy objects to “individualized racial

64

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW HEIGHTENED SCRUTINY

[Vol. 15

Solicitor General Donald Verrilli tried to reframe the argument
about diversity within racial groups directly in terms of the educational benefits noted in Grutter, such as breaking down racial stereotypes. Mr. Verrilli argued that
universities . . . are looking . . . not to grant a preference for privilege, but
to make individualized decisions about applicants who will directly further the education mission. For example, they will look for individuals
who will play against racial stereotypes . . . : [t]he African American fenc54
er; the Hispanic who has . . . mastered classical Greek.

However, neither Mr. Garre nor Mr. Verrilli tied these ideas directly
to the notion of critical mass. This link is clear in Grutter, which defines “critical mass” in terms of the educational benefits of diversity
(including within-group diversity), such as breaking down racial ste55
reotypes. Moreover, even the Plaintiffs’ and UT’s notion of critical
mass—numbers such that minority students do not “feel isolated and
56
like spokespersons for their race” —is related to diversity within racial groups. One possible reason to have a mix of minority students
from high and low socioeconomic backgrounds is that the former,
who have often attended predominantly White schools in affluent
districts or elite, private schools, may help the latter adjust socially to
elite, predominantly White universities. This argument was raised by
Shanta Driver, a lawyer for the student intervenors in Grutter, at a debate on affirmative action shortly after the Supreme Court’s ruling in
57
Grutter. In addition to their surveys on feelings of isolation, universi-

54
55
56
57

classification of applicants” which can “affront individual dignity and . . . exacerbate
group division.” Reva B. Siegel, From Colorblindness to Antibalkanization: An Emerging
Ground of Decision in Race Equality Cases, 120 YALE L.J. 1278, 1308 (2011). Professor Siegel
further contends that “[h]ad the school districts simply relied on race-conscious but facially neutral attendance zones to promote integration—rather than using race to evaluate individual student applications to magnet schools—Justice Kennedy emphasizes that
he would have upheld the policy.” Id. But see Heather Gerken, Justice Kennedy and the Domains of Equal Protection, 121 HARV. L. REV. 104, 117 (2007) (observing that in Parents Involved, “Justice Kennedy . . . makes a remarkably similar argument [to Justice O’Connor’s
argument in Grutter], even observing that public schools could use a Grutter-like admissions policy as a last resort”); see also Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 797–98 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“[A] district may consider it a compelling interest to achieve a diverse student population. Race may be one component of
that diversity, but other demographic factors, plus special talents and needs, should also
be considered.”).
See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 60, audio available at
http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2012/2012_11_345/argument?clip=3448/3464.
See supra notes 39–41 and accompanying text.
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 319 (2003). See also supra notes 6, 17 and accompanying text.
See Harpalani, supra note 4, at 513 n.226. I was in attendance at the debate which included Ms. Driver. She was asked why affirmative action is justified if it primarily benefits
more privileged minorities. Ms. Driver responded by stating that at the University of
Michigan, about one-half of the Black undergraduate students come from relatively privi-
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ties would be wise to investigate whether such intragroup social support does occur, and whether diversity within racial groups helps to
ensure that minority students adjust well and do not feel isolated.
Universities can use such data to bolster arguments for race-conscious
58
admissions policies.
There were a few other points raised with respect to critical mass,
none of which clarified the concept any further. When Mr. Rein stated that the Plaintiffs “don’t believe that demographics [of the state of
59
Texas] are the key to . . . critical mass,” Justice Sotomayor retorted
that the Plaintiffs “can’t seriously suggest that demographics aren’t a
factor to be looked at” in conjunction with feelings of isolation
60
among minority students. But Justice Antonin Scalia suggested otherwise, noting that the “right” position in his view is “that the demographic makeup of the State has nothing to do with whether somebody feels isolated . . . in a State that is only 1 percent Black that
doesn’t mean [Black students are] not isolated so long as there’s 1
61
percent in the class.” Ironically, UT seemed to agree with Justice
Scalia, and with Mr. Rein and the Plaintiffs. When Justice Alito asked
Mr. Garre if “the critical mass for the University of Texas [is] de62
pendent on the breakdown of the population of Texas,” Mr. Garre
replied “[n]o, it’s not at all. . . . It’s looking to the educational bene63
fits of diversity on campus.” Mr. Garre tried to frame this answer as
64
a point that he and Mr. Rein “actually agree on” —but neither of
them defined these educational benefits in any tangible sense.
Justice Alito also asked Mr. Garre whether critical mass could “vary
65
66
from group to group” and “from State to State” —to which UT’s

58
59
60
61

62
63
64
65

leged families, while the other half come from inner-city Detroit, and that the “reason
[Black students from the inner-city] survive on campus is because of the [more privileged
Black students].” I cannot verify the numbers or the assertion by Ms. Driver, but it is a
well-founded hypothesis and worthy of more investigation.
Id.
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 14, audio available at http://www.oyez.org/
cases/2010-2019/2012/2012_11_345/argument?clip=728/734.
Id., audio available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2012/2012_11_345/
argument?clip=741/742.
Id.
at
15,
audio
available
at
http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2012/
2012_11_345/argument?clip=772/794; see also id. at 48, audio available at
http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2012/2012_11_345/argument?clip=2760/2769
(Justice Alito asking Mr. Garre “would 3 percent [black student population] be enough in
New Mexico . . . where the African American population is around 2 percent?”).
Id. at 40, audio available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2012/2012_11_345/
argument?clip=2287/2332.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 39, audio available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2012/2012_11_345/
argument?clip=2287/2332.
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counsel replied that “[i]t certainly is contextual” and “it could vary.”
But this also did not clarify the concept further.
In the end, Justice Scalia’s comment that “[w]e should probably
stop calling it critical mass . . . . Call it a cloud or something like that”
68
resonated the most. Although my view of Fisher and race-conscious
admissions is quite different from Justice Scalia’s view, I do agree with
him that Fisher’s search for “critical mass” is a fishing expedition.
Nevertheless, defining “critical mass” is not necessary to resolve
Fisher. The Supreme Court could resolve the case by focusing directly
on the educational benefits of diversity (and specifically on diversity
within racial groups), rather than on the presence or absence of a
critical mass. The Court could require UT to demonstrate that its
race-conscious policy contributes to the educational benefits of diversity above and beyond the Top Ten Percent Law, by facilitating ad69
mission of students who are different in some meaningful way. UT
might do this by showing that its race-conscious policy allows admission of Black and Latina/o students from different socioeconomic
backgrounds (who have different viewpoints and experiences from
70
those admitted under the Top Ten Percent Law), or minority stu71
dents in different majors, or perhaps a different group of minority
72
students, such as Native Americans. If UT could not demonstrate
satisfactorily that its race-conscious policy does indeed make such a
73
“unique contribution to diversity,” then the policy would no longer
be constitutional. Thus, this approach offers the stopping point for
race-conscious admissions policies that the Justices were searching for
74
during oral arguments. Moreover, by employing such a “unique
contribution to diversity” test, the stopping point would be directly
contingent on the success of the policy in contributing to the educational benefits of diversity, not on some numerically or contextually
vague definition of “critical mass.”

66
67
68

69
70
71
72
73
74

Id.
Id. See also Harpalani, supra note 4, at 479–83 (discussing reasons why “critical mass” may
vary from group to group).
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 70–71, audio available at
http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2012/2012_11_345/argument?clip=4060/4085.
The courtroom erupted in laughter after Justice Scalia made this statement. Id.
Harpalani, supra note 4, at 523–26.
Id. at 525.
Id.
Id. at 524.
Id. at 523.
See id. at 526.
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Of course, this leaves open another question: how much diversity
75
is enough? A university can always admit different students to increase the overall diversity of its student body, and Grutter stated that
race-conscious policies should be phased out eventually. But UT’s
race-conscious policy is already much more modest than the Universi76
ty of Michigan School of Law’s policy in Grutter. In that sense, UT is
much further along in phasing out the use of race than most universities (which do not have a Top Ten Percent Law to help diversify the
student body), and the Court should recognize this.
In fact, in their Supreme Court brief, the Fisher Plaintiffs even argued that race was too small of a factor for UT’s policy to be constitu77
tional. At oral argument, Justice Kennedy first questioned this log78
ic, and then suggested that the rationale for this argument might be
that UT “shouldn’t impose this hurt or this injury [of using

75
76

77

78

A full answer to this question is beyond the scope of this Essay. However, I consider it in
greater depth in my prior Article. See id. at 527–30.
See Brief of Appellees at 18, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 631 F.3d 213 (5th Cir. 2011)
(No. 09-50822), available at http://www.utexas.edu/vp/irla/Documents/Fisher.v.St.o.TxAppellees.Brief.pdf (noting that “UT’s holistic consideration of race is even more modest
than the policy upheld in Grutter”). At oral argument, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg also
noted that UT’s race-conscious policy is “more modest” than the policy upheld “in Grutter.”
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 10, audio available at
http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2012/2012_11_345/argument?clip=440/458; see
also Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 645 F. Supp. 2d 587, 608 (W.D. Tex. 2009) (noting
that “UT considers race in its admissions process as a factor of a factor of a factor of a factor”).
See Brief for Petitioner at 38, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, No. 11-345 (U.S. filed May
21,
2012),
available
at
http://www.utexas.edu/vp/irla/Documents/
Fisher%27s%20Merits%20Brief%205%2021%202012.pdf (arguing that “where racial
classifications have only a ‘minimal impact’ in pursuing a compelling interest, it ‘casts
doubt on the necessity of using racial classifications’ in the first instance” (citing Parents
Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 734 (2007); id. at 790
(Kennedy, J., concurring))); see also Ian Ayres & Sydney Foster, Don’t Tell, Don’t Ask: Narrow Tailoring After Grutter and Gratz, 85 TEX. L. REV. 517, 523 n.27 (2007) (“At least as a
theoretical matter, narrow tailoring requires not only that preferences not be too large,
but also that they not be too small so as to fail to achieve the goals of the relevant compelling government interest.”). But see Harpalani, supra note 4, at 532 n.311, 532–33 (explaining how even a small number of minority students could have a meaningful impact
on educational benefits of diversity).
See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 22, audio available at
http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2012/2012_11_345/argument?clip=1266/1341
(Justice Kennedy asking Plaintiff’s counsel “what’s the problem” with “the University’s
race-conscious admission plan . . . admit[ting] . . . so few minorities” and noting that he
“had trouble with that [argument] reading the brief”). Justice Ginsburg asked a similar
question of Mr. Garre. See id. at 50, audio available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/20102019/2012/2012_11_345/argument?clip=2898/2922 (asking UT’s counsel if “the game is
just too small to warrant using a racial criteria”).
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80

race] . . . for so little benefit,” and Mr. Rein agreed.
However,
there are several problems with this reasoning.
First, nothing in Grutter suggests that a race-conscious policy can
be too small to be constitutional: in fact, Grutter implies the opposite
81
with its sunset principle for such policies. Universities cannot eliminate race-conscious policies all at once, when some magic “critical
82
mass” is obtained. Rather, Grutter contemplates that universities will
gradually phase out race-conscious policies and use race neutral al83
ternatives “as they develop.” A logical consequence of this is that at
some point, a university’s use of race will be very small but still constitutional.
Second, even modest use of race can facilitate the admission of
students who add new perspectives and thus contribute to the educa84
tional benefits of diversity. This is the crux of the “unique contribu85
tion to diversity” test noted earlier and described in detail in my pri86
or Article. At the Fisher oral argument, Justice Alito noted that UT
has “over 5,000 classes that qualified as small and the total number of
African Americans and Hispanics who were admitted under [UT’s
87
race-conscious policy] was just a little over 200,” and asked “how can
that possibly do more than a tiny, tiny amount to increase classroom
88
diversity.” Mr. Garre’s response focused on the “shocking isolation”
89
of minority students in classes. But the educational benefits of diversity also occur outside classrooms. There is far more student interaction in campus dorms, student organizations, and in social
events on campus than there is in the classroom. A small number of
minority students may readily form a student organization and spon-

79
80
81

82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89

See id. at 23, audio available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2012/
2012_11_345/argument?clip=1266/1341.
See id.
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 342 (2003) (“[R]ace-conscious admissions policies
must be limited in time. . . . In the context of higher education, the durational requirement can be met by sunset provisions in race-conscious admissions policies and periodic
reviews to determine whether racial preferences are still necessary to achieve student
body diversity.”).
See Harpalani, supra note 4, at 533–34.
539 U.S. at 342 (“Universities . . . can and should draw on the most promising aspects
of . . . race-neutral alternatives as they develop.”).
See Harpalani, supra note 4, at 532 n.311, 532–33 (explaining how even a small number of
minority students could have a meaningful impact on educational benefits of diversity).
See supra notes 69–73 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 69–73.
See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 36–37, audio available at
http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2012/2012_11_345/argument?clip=2149/2150.
See id.
See id. at 37, audio available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2012/
2012_11_345/argument?clip=2159/2175.
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sor events related to diversity, thus educating the entire campus (or at
least all students who are interested). Although Mr. Garre noted that
UT’s asserted compelling interest is not limited to classroom diversity, UT would have done better to emphasize and elaborate upon
campus diversity and its educational benefits.
90
Finally, it is impossible to eliminate the use of race altogether.
Even if UT’s race-conscious policy is struck down in Fisher, the University could still use race in the application process—albeit not as a
box to be checked on the front of each application. Chief Justice
Roberts underscored the fact that “race is the only one of [UT’s] ho91
listic factors that appears on the cover of every application,” but this
point is trivial, especially when the use of race is very modest, as it is
92
in UT’s policy. Even if it is not on the front of the application, race
may be discerned in other ways—via an applicant’s personal statement, student group membership, and other sources on the applica93
tion, including names which are highly correlated with racial group
94
membership. Larger scale use of race might be detectable statistically: for example, in both Regents of the University of California v.
90

91
92
93

94

See Harpalani, supra note 4, at 532 n.311 (“There is no way to completely eliminate race
from a holistic admissions process, as information about an applicant’s race may be present throughout the application via personal statements, student group membership, and
even names which are correlated with group membership.”). See also infra notes 95, 100.
See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 53, audio available at
http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2012/2012_11_345/argument?clip=3037/3059.
See supra notes 76–77 and accompanying text.
See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 304–05 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“One can
reasonably anticipate . . . that colleges and universities will seek to maintain their minority
enrollment . . . whether or not they can do so in full candor through adoption of affirmative action plans . . . . Without recourse to such plans, institutions of higher education
may resort to camouflage. For example, schools may encourage applicants to write of
their cultural traditions in the essays they submit, or to indicate whether English is their
second language. Seeking to improve their chances for admission, applicants may highlight the minority group associations to which they belong, or the Hispanic surnames of
their mothers or grandparents. In turn, teachers’ recommendations may emphasize who
a student is as much as what he or she has accomplished. . . . If honesty is the best policy,
surely Michigan’s accurately described, fully disclosed College affirmative action program
is preferable to achieving similar numbers through winks, nods, and disguises.”); see also,
e.g., Admissions, UC BERKELEY, http://admissions.berkeley.edu (last visited Feb. 14, 2013);
The Personal Statement, UC BERKELEY, http://admissions.berkeley.edu/personalstatement
(last visited Feb. 14, 2013) (application and personal statement weblinks for the University of California at Berkeley). Prompt #1 for freshman applicants is “[d]escribe the world
you come from—for example, your family, community or school—and tell us how your
world has shaped your dreams and aspirations.” Id. Applicants can readily allude to their
racial background in response to this prompt, and members of underrepresented minority groups can self-identify here.
See Roland G. Fryer, Jr. & Steven D. Levitt, The Causes and Consequences of Distinctively Black
Names, 119 Q. J. OF ECON. 767 (2004); Gratz, 539 U.S. at 304 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(noting that without affirmative action, “applicants may highlight . . . Hispanic surnames”).
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96

Bakke and Grutter v. Bollinger, the Plaintiffs submitted statistical evidence of disparities in test scores between admitted minority and
non-minority students. However, no such evidence was presented in
Fisher—possibly because race was such a small factor that such evidence would not prove anything. In fact, in their Supreme Court
brief, the Fisher Plaintiffs themselves note that “UT is unable to identify any students who were ‘ultimately offered admission due to their
97
race who would not have otherwise been offered admission.’”
Even if UT does not endorse such use of race, individual reviewers—at least some of whom will be interested in increasing racial diversity among the undergraduate student body—will still be aware of
applicants’ racial background and still be able to use this infor98
mation. Under Grutter, the use of race in holistic admissions is al99
ready required to be flexible and discretionary : it is already up to
individual reviewers whether to consider an applicant’s race and how
100
much weight to give it. Even if it is not “on the cover of every appli-

95
96

97

98

99

100

438 U.S. 265, 277 n.7 (comparing Plaintiff Alan Bakke’s GPA and MCAT scores with
those of all applicants and of underrepresented minority applicants).
See Harpalani, supra note 4, at 528 n.289 (“The Grutter Plaintiffs used data on the undergraduate GPAs and Law School Admissions Test (“LSAT”) scores of accepted and rejected applicants to the University of Michigan School from 1995 to 2000, all sorted by race,
and calculated the odds of acceptance for members of each group. Part of the basis for
their argument was that after statistically controlling for academic criteria and other variables, Black, Latino, and Native American applicants had a much higher probability of
being accepted to the Law School than White and Asian American applicants.”).
Brief for Petitioner, supra note 77, at 38–39. The Fisher Plaintiffs used this argument to
bolster their claim that race had too small of an impact to be constitutional. See supra
notes 77–80 and accompanying text. But see Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 1, at
63, audio available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2012/2012_11_345/
argument?clip=3591/3642 (Chief Justice Roberts asking the Solicitor General if he
“agree[s] that [race] makes a difference in some cases,” to which the Solicitor General responded “[y]es, it does”).
See supra note 93; Devon W. Carbado & Cheryl I. Harris, The New Racial Preferences, 96
CALIF. L. REV. 1139, 1146 (2008) (raising “the question of whether race can in fact be
eliminated from admissions processes”); Daniel N. Lipson, Embracing Diversity: The Institutionalization of Affirmative Action as Diversity Management at UC-Berkeley, UT-Austin, and UWMadison, 32 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 985, 1015 (2007) (noting that “the line between racebased and race-blind policy making can be quite blurry”).
See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 337 (“[T]he [University of Michigan] Law School
engages in a highly individualized, holistic review of each applicant’s file, giving serious
consideration to all the ways an applicant might contribute to a diverse educational environment. The Law School affords this individualized consideration to applicants of all
races. There is no policy, either de jure or de facto, of automatic acceptance or rejection
based on any single ‘soft’ variable.”).
This point came up in oral arguments when Justice Scalia asked Mr. Verrilli that if two
applicants “are identical in all other respects. . . . what does the racial preference mean if
it doesn’t mean that in that situation the minority applicant wins and the other one loses?” See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 62. Mr. Verrilli responded that
“[t]here may not be a racial preference in that situation. It’s going to depend on a holis-
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cation,” race might still be as much of a factor in UT admissions as
it has been since 2004, when UT began its current race-conscious pol102
icy.
In fact, a similar issue arose in California, where the state constitu103
tion bans explicit consideration of race in public education. In August 2008, Professor Tim Groseclose of the University of California at
Los Angeles (UCLA) authored an 89-page report, in which he accused university admissions committee members of using applicant
personal statements and other sources of information to give preferential treatment to minority applicants, specifically African Ameri104
cans, in spite of the California Constitution’s proscription. Others,
such as anti-affirmative action organizer Ward Connerly, have also ac105
cused the UC system of using race informally.
The larger point is that as a practical matter, such minimal use of
race is difficult to detect and prove in a holistic admissions system

101
102

103

104

105

tic, individualized consideration of the applicant.” Id. Justice Kennedy seemed dismayed,
stating that he “thought that the whole point is that sometimes race has to be a tiebreaker . . . [and if] it isn’t. . . . then we should just say you can’t use race.” Id. Mr. Verrilli responded that “[race] functions more subtly than that.” Id.
See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
Of course, it may cost more for universities to review applications if race is not on the
cover. However, universities have adjusted to similar cost increases in the past. See
Harpalani, supra note 4, at 532 n.309 (“[C]olleges and universities have adjusted to similar circumstances in the past: after Grutter, institutions had to expend more resources on
holistic admissions and eliminate more cost-effective point systems similar to the one
struck down in Gratz.”); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 275 (2003) (“Respondents contend that ‘[t]he volume of applications and the presentation of applicant information
make it impractical for [the undergraduate college] to use the . . . admissions system’ upheld by the Court today in Grutter . . . But the fact that the implementation of a program
capable of providing individualized consideration might present administrative challenges does not render constitutional an otherwise problematic system.” (internal citation
omitted)).
CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 31(a) (“The state shall not discriminate against, or grant preferential treatment to, any individual or group on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin in the operation of public employment, public education, or public contracting.”).
Tim Groseclose, Report on Suspected Malfeasance in UCLA Admissions and the Accompanying
Cover-Up (Aug. 28, 2008), http://images.ocregister.com/newsimages/news/2008/
08/CUARSGrosecloseResignationReport.pdf. One article on the UCLA controversy was
entitled Is “Holistic” Admissions a Cover for Helping Black Applicants? See Is “Holistic” Admissions a Cover for Helping Black Applicants?, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Sept. 2, 2008, 4:00 AM),
http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2008/09/02/ucla.
Lipson, supra note 98, at 1015 (noting that “Ward Connerly . . . put forth and later partially retracted accusations that the admissions officials at UC-Berkeley were ‘slipping’
race in through the back door via individual assessment (e.g., by preferring applicants
from school districts that are predominantly African American or Hispanic, by preferring
applicants with names that are predominantly African American or Hispanic, and/or by
preferring applicants who identify or give clues that they are African American or Hispanic in their personal statements”)).
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with individualized consideration of applicants. There is no way to
completely eliminate race from such a holistic admissions process,
and the search for total race neutrality is another fishing expedition.
Nevertheless, the Court is likely to rule against UT: the question is
107
just how much it will limit the scope of race-conscious admissions.
One possibility is a narrow holding: the Court could rule simply that
UT reached a “critical mass” (however that is defined) with the Top
Ten Percent Law alone, or at least that it did not adequately demonstrate the need for its race-conscious policy. If this happens, it will
limit UT’s use of race but leave Grutter largely in place for other uni108
versities. Alternatively, the Court could issue a broader ruling that
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107
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This issue did not arise in Fisher and prior affirmative action cases because the institutions
in question admitted that they used race intentionally in their admissions process. But if
race-conscious policies are formally struck down by the Court, this would not happen: use
of race would not be formally sanctioned by the institutions. In that case, Plaintiffs would
have the higher burden of proving intentional use of race. See Washington v. Davis, 426
U.S. 229, 242 (1976) (noting that the Supreme Court has “not held that a law, neutral on
its face and serving ends otherwise within the power of government to pursue, is invalid
under the Equal Protection Clause simply because it may affect a greater proportion of
one race than of another”); Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979)
(holding that the Equal Protection Clause protects only against discrimination that occurs “‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse effects upon an identifiable
group”).
See, e.g., Tomiko Brown-Nagin, The Diversity Paradox: Judicial Review in an Age of Demographic and Educational Change, 65 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 113, 117 (2012) (noting that in Fisher,
“the decisive vote of Justice Anthony Kennedy . . . likely will preclude repudiation of Grutter’s central holding”); Allen Rostron, Affirmative Action, Justice Kennedy, and the Virtues of
the Middle Ground, 107 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 74, 78 (2012) (contending that in Fisher,
“the most likely outcome is that Kennedy will . . . refus[e] to put a complete stop to affirmative action, but insist[] . . . that rigorous strict scrutiny really and truly will apply”);
see also Vikram David Amar, Is Honesty the Best (Judicial) Policy in Affirmative Action Cases?
Fisher v. University of Texas Gives the Court (Yet) Another Chance to Say Yes, 65 VAND. L. REV.
EN BANC. 77, 88 (2012) (contending that “the most likely Fisher result” is one in which
“[t]he window for race-based affirmative action in higher education will be narrowed, but
left ever-so-slightly open” (footnote omitted)).
Nevertheless, there are a couple of possibilities for the Court upholding UT’s raceconscious policy. There is a slight chance that Justice Kennedy could vote to uphold UT’s
race-conscious policy because it is so modest. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 393
(2003) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“There is no constitutional objection to the goal of considering race as one modest factor among many others to achieve diversity . . . .”); see also
supra note 76 and accompanying text (noting how modest UT’s race-conscious policy is).
However, this seems unlikely given Justice Kennedy’s consternation at UT’s focus on race.
See supra notes 51–53 and accompanying text. Additionally, there is a slight chance that
Fisher could be dismissed by the Court on procedural grounds. For arguments in favor of
such dismissal, see Adam D. Chandler, How (Not) To Bring an Affirmative-Action Challenge,
122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 85 (2012), http://yalelawjournal.org/2012/10/01/chandler.html.
In response to Justice Stephen Breyer’s question about whether the Plaintiffs were asking
the Justices to “overrule Grutter,” Mr. Rein stated that “we have said very carefully we were
not trying to change the Court’s disposition of the issue in Grutter [that] there [could]
be a . . . compelling interest . . . in using race to establish a diverse class.” Transcript of
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displaces critical mass and articulates a different standard for the
constitutionality of race-conscious admissions policies. For example,
Fisher might preclude individualized consideration of race altogether
but allow facially neutral policies which take racial demographics into
109
consideration, such as the Top Ten Percent Law. If the Court does
this, it will limit the scope of race-conscious admissions broadly,
which would affect universities across the nation. However, it will not
be able to completely eliminate individualized consideration of race
from the admissions process. Universities may not be able to consider race as a separate factor, but it will still enter the calculus through
applicants’ personal statements and essays and the other sources not110
ed above. Moreover, while significant use of race could be detected
statistically, application reviewers who are sympathetic will still be
able to employ modest race consciousness in decision-making, even if
this is not endorsed in university policy.
Functionally, this may be no different from UT’s current, modest
use of race in admissions: it will just add another dimension to the
111
stealth that is inherent in holistic admissions. The entire Fisher case
may just be a fishing expedition: a futile search for critical mass and
total race neutrality in UT’s admissions system. Nevertheless, if the
ruling limits Grutter significantly, then Fisher’s fishing expedition
might reel in race-conscious admissions at other universities.
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110
111

Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 8, audio available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/20102019/2012/2012_11_345/argument?clip=308/372.
See Siegel, supra note 53, at 1308 (contending that Justice Kennedy is skeptical of individualized consideration of race but would uphold race-conscious but facially neutral policies if they serve a compelling interest).
See supra notes 90–106 and accompanying text.
See Paul J. Mishkin, The Uses of Ambivalence: Reflections on the Supreme Court and the Constitutionality of Affirmative Action, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 907, 928 (1983) (“The indirectness of the
less explicitly numerical systems may have significant advantages, not so much in terms of
the processes of consideration as in the felt impact of their operation over time. The description of race as simply ‘another factor’ among a lot of others considered in seeking
diversity tends to minimize the sense that minority students are separate and different
and the recipients of special dispensations; the use of more explicitly separate and structured systems might have the opposite effect.”).
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